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iPrivatization, Unemployment and Subsidy for Low-skilled Labor:
Abstract
by Katalin Balla {G¶ abor Kertesi{J¶ anos KÄ oll} o{Andr¶ as Simonovits
In their seminal paper, Aghion and Blanchard (1993) (for short: A{B) have modeled
the dynamic interconnection between privatization and unemployment. A key feature of
the transition (not analyzed by A{B) is the huge di®erence between the unemployment
rates of skilled (H) and unskilled (L) labor. Generalizing the A{B-model, in this paper
we prove that by introducing an appropriate subsidy, the employment of L-labor can
be signi¯cantly increased without essentially diminishing that of H-labor. Since the
subsidy increases the long-term net wage of L and decreases that of H, there is a limit
on subsidies.
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ii1. Introduction
In their seminal paper, Aghion and Blanchard [1993] (A{B for short) have modeled
the dynamic interactions between privatization, wages, taxes and employment. Several
papers of the `optimal speed of transition' literature that grew out of the A{B model have
relaxed its assumptions. including Brixiova and Kiyotaki (1997), Jurajda and Terrell
(2003) and Boeri (2001). The model closest to ours was built by Commander and
Tolstopyatenko (1997). Commander and Tolstopiatenko (2001) distinguished between
the formal and informal sectors, with workers choosing between formal and informal
employment in response to taxes and the punishment of tax evasion, while the present
authors distinguished between the skilled and unskilled (or high and low productivity
workers).
Thus we follow them in assuming heterogeneity (of workers and sectors) while ad-
hering to the logics of the original benchmark A{B model, as far as possible. Under
state socialism, all workers are employed in the state sector and are paid a uniform
wage irrespective of di®erences in their (potential) productivity. Following an initial
shock, privatization begins and the state (government) sector workers gradually lose
their jobs. Hiring decisions in the emerging private sector depend on pro¯t per worker
that is a®ected by workers' productivity (skill endowments), wages, and taxes. Wages
vary with unemployment bene¯ts and the probability of being hired in the private sec-
tor, while taxes have to be su±ciently high to cover the costs of unemployment bene¯ts
and possible other transfers. Heterogeneity is taken into account in a most simple way
by distinguishing between two types of labor (skilled versus unskilled) and two sectors
with di®erent skills composition. In the ¯rst part of the paper, a model is analyzed as-
suming a fully segmented economy wherein skilled and unskilled workers are employed
in two separate sectors denoted by M and S. Later on we show that the qualitative
conclusions do not change if we allow Leontief technologies, with one sector employing
predominantly skilled and another employing mostly unskilled labor.
The model has three policy variables: the speed of closing the state sector, the level
of the unemployment bene¯t, and a possible transfer intended to reduce the relative
costs of low-skilled labor. (The per-worker subsidy and an endogeneously determined
poll tax determine the total tax burden on employment). The parameters are chosen at
the onset of transition and left unchanged thereafter. By `subsidy' we mean any kind
of assistance, which is ¯nanced from tax revenues and reduces the user cost of unskilled
labor.
Similarly to A{B we ¯nd that there is a maximum speed of closure compatible
with successful transition. However, our main point of interest is how employment and
wages of the two groups are a®ected by bene¯ts and net taxes. We identify two regimes
conducive to high aggregate employment and relatively small di®erences in employment
probabilities: one with low bene¯ts and another with high bene¯ts combined with
subsidy for the low-productivity workers (sector). Generous bene¯ts combined with no
transfer lead to lower aggregate employment and severe inequalities.
Why is it important to introduce heterogeneity to the modeling of transition, and
how can we justify the idealizations that we make? Distinguishing between skilled and
unskilled labor (and the sectors, which employ them) is motivated by the observation of
an exceptionally strong bias against less-educated labor in Central and East-European
(CEE) labor markets. Recently, the employment ratio of the population having no
1upper secondary education ranges between 30 per cent in Slovakia and 47 per cent in
the Czech Republic compared to a 57 per cent average in the OECD as a whole. (Table
1). While in the last decade low-skilled employment was on the rise in the OECD it fell
with two-digit percentages in the CEEs. This decline continued in most countries until
recently. Micro-data available for us in Hungary suggest that the gap between unskilled
and skilled employment is indeed skill-speci¯c rather than a statistical artifact re°ecting
age-speci¯c di®erentials.
Table 1.
Employment{population ratios in the age range 25-64 by educational attainment, 2001
Below upper Upper Below upper sec.
secondary secondary Tertiary 1995=100
OECD average 57 75 84 101.7
(standard dev.) (10) (6) (7)
Czech Republic 47 76 88 83.9
Hungary 371 72 83 100.02
Poland 41 65 84 82.0
Slovakia 30 70 87 76.9
Slovenia3 40 74 87 ...
Source: OECD (2003). Notes: 1) Hungary 1995: authors' calculation from the Labor
Force Survey. 2) 86.2 in 1992-95. 3) European Commission, 2003, p. 56, population
aged 15-64
Furthermore, the exceptionally low employment ratio of the less-educated accounts
for the bulk of the gap that exists between the aggregate employment ratios of the
OECD and the CEEs. This is shown in Table 2 where the gaps are decomposed using
data on the population's educational composition and education-speci¯c employment
ratios. In Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia almost the entire gap is accounted for by the
exceptionally low employment ratio of the less educated; in the Czech Republic this
is the only component having a negative contribution; while in Poland other factors
(such as the poor employment prospects of workers with vocational secondary school
background) also play a role.
2Table 2. Deviation of the employment-population ratio
from the OECD average { Decomposition, 2002, per cent
Aggregate Weighted with the Weighted with the
employment, educational composition of educational composition of
deviation t h e O E C D the country
from the Parameter All other Parameter All other
OECD mean e®ect of e®ect e®ect of e®ect
per cent L-employment L-employment
Hungary { 7.8 {6.4 {1.2 {5.8 {2.0
Poland {10.7 {6.1 {4.6 {3.4 {7.3
Slovakia { 5.0 {9.3 4.3 {4.1 {0.9
Slovenia { 6.0 {5.4 {0.6 {5.8 {0.2
Czech Rep. 2.6 {3.8 6.4 {1.4 4.0
Data source: OECD (2004). Low-skilled stands for less than upper secondary degree
We admittedly make at least three strong simplifying assumptions in modeling the
transition with heterogeneous labor. First, we disregard within-sector substitution be-
tween skilled and unskilled labor. This assumption can be supported by translog cost
function estimates available for Hungary (Halpern et al., 2004) suggesting that the de-
mand for skilled and unskilled labor are nearly independent. Second, we consider two
separate segments of the economy with no capital mobility between them, and therefore
no tendency to eliminate the pro¯t di®erentials that occasionally arise. The second
idealization is more di±cult to justify. It applies as far as we talk of segments with
rather di®erent skills requirements and di®erent sources of ¯nance, such as rural SMEs
versus large industrial organizations, street-corner shops versus huge shopping centers,
traditional micro-businesses versus modern service networks, and so on. We believe that
there is indeed little capital mobility between these segments and that their `struggle
for life' had crucial impact on the fate of low-skilled labor in transforming economies.
Unlike in Southern Europe { a region with similar skill endowments { agriculture, tra-
ditional handicraft, retail trade, services and low-tech manufacturing proved incapable
of creating jobs for low-skilled wage labor at a large scale.
Third, we do not close our model by showing explicitly what happens to the pro¯ts
earned by one sector or another { the model simply establishes a link between expected
pro¯ts and subsequent job creation. Assuming a feedback from higher ex post pro¯ts to
more job creation would magnify the tendencies that we identify, and would therefore
be redundant. A formal account of the linkages between pro¯ts, price formation, prod-
uct market competition and investment decisions extends beyond the capacity of this
model, which proves quite complicated even under its restrictive assumptions. We hope
that it can even so provide useful insights to the policy options of the new democratic
governments and the implications of their choices.
In Sections 2, 3 and 4 we examine the simple model, where the skilled and un-
skilled labor work exclusively in the M- and S-sectors, respectively. In Section 2 we
derive the dynamic equations: the closing of the government sector, the emergence of
unemployment and the creation of the private sector.
3Section 3 analyzes the simple model. First we show that under moderate subsidies
the employment as well as the net wage of the skilled labor is higher than those of
the unskilled labor, respectively. Then the post-transition period is analyzed and the
stability conditions of full employment are determined.
In Section 4, using simulation, it is demonstrated that for a relatively large period
of initial unemployment rates, the system is viable and stable. By choosing an appro-
priate subsidy, the di®erence between the two types of employment can be signi¯cantly
diminished. More precisely, the subsidization of the unskilled labor hardly changes
the employment of skilled labor (the burden of subsidies is put on the skilled workers'
wage), while the employment of the unskilled labor is radically raised (and the subsidy
increases their wages as well). This comparison is repeated for several settings, chang-
ing the parameter values of the unemployment bene¯t and the speed of closing of the
government sector.
In Section 5 we relax the counterfactual assumption of the simple model and we
only assume that the M-sector employs skilled labor in a much higher proportion than
the S-sector does. In the complex model the impact of subsidies is smaller, because the
employment of the skilled labor requires the employment of the unskilled, too.
At the end of the introduction, we summarize the essence of our simulation results.
For the sake of transparency, it is assumed that the share of the skilled and unskilled in
the total population is 0.5-0.5. In contrast to the simple model, in the M-sector 80 per
cent of the employees are skilled, and in the S-sector, 80 per cent of the employees are
unskilled. We compare the case of no subsidies to that of subsidies (1/4 of the di®erence
between the productivities) and the case of high versus low unemployment bene¯t (30
per cent vs. 20 per cent of the high productivity). The transition last for 24 years.
Then the employment data at the end of transition are as follows.
Table 3. End-of-transition employment structures
Unemployment Skilled Unskilled
Model bene¯t Subsidy E m p l o y m e n t
Simple high no 0.380 0.199
high yes 0.384 0.274
low no 0.431 0.338
low yes 0.428 0.366
Complex high no 0.369 0.245
high yes 0.375 0.291
In all the six cases, the employment (rate) of the skilled is much higher than that of
the unskilled; the largest di®erence arises in the simple model with high unemployment
bene¯ts and no subsidies (the ratio is close to 2). For high unemployment bene¯t and
given subsidies, the employment is much higher in the complex model than in the simple
one: e.g. 24.5 vs. 19.9 for the high bene¯t{no subsidies case. (In terms of employment
rates, the corresponding numbers are twice as high: 49 and 39.8 per cent.) On the other
hand, in the simple model with high unemployment bene¯t, the introduction of realistic
subsidies dramatically increases the employment of unskilled, while slightly increasing
the employment of the skilled, too. In the simple model with low unemployment bene¯t
and in the complex model, the impact of subsidies is smaller.
4Section 6 concludes. The more sophisticated proofs are relegated to a separate
Appendix.
2. The simple model
In this Section we present a simple generalization of the A{B-model, where the skilled
and unskilled workers are exclusively employed in the M- and the S-sectors, respectively.
There is no free °ow between the two sectors, therefore the pro¯t di®erences need not
be eliminated. The ingredients of this simple model are the following.
The beginning
For decades, there was a socialist economy with full employment and without any sig-
ni¯cant di®erence between skilled and unskilled labor. Due to the sudden collapse of
the Soviet-type system, full employment was replaced by a partial employment with an
initial unemployment rate u0.
Dual labor market
We distinguish two types of labor: skilled (H-type) and unskilled (L-type). The time-
invariant productivity of i-type is equal to yi, yH > yL.
The i-type's earning, wi changes endogenously: (4) below. For simplicity, let us
assume that the government charges a poll tax z for every worker, whose value is de-
termined by the macrobudget equation (5). The private sector only employs an i-type
worker if the per capita pro¯t ¼i is positive. Since the unemployment bene¯t is indepen-
dent of type, it is impossible to pay a su±ciently low wage to the unskilled workers which
would make their employment pro¯table. To alleviate unemployment, the government
pays the ¯rms transfer (k) for every employed of L-type. One part of the transfer (k1)
is simply a compensation, without which the unskilled would pay higher tax rates than
the skilled ones. (Like in the A{B-model, the government employees do not get any
compensation!) The remaining part (k2) serves as employment subsidies: k = k1 + k2.
The net pro¯ts per worker are given by ¼H = yH ¡ wH ¡ z, ¼L = yL ¡ wL ¡ z + k,
respectively.
The introduction of a compensation transfer ensures the equality of taxes rather than
of tax rates in the two sectors. Indeed, given the other parameters of the model, one
can determine a transfer k = k1, so that the tax rates ¿H = z=wH and ¿L = (z ¡k)=wL
be equal at period T=2 and 3T=2, where T is the length of transition.
Thus the (di®erential) equations of the A{B-model are modi¯ed and doubled as
follows.
Closing of government sector
We must break down the government jobs as well as their closing to H- and L-types: let
EH and EL be the number of H- and L-type workers, respectively, and E = EH + EL
be their sum. We shall assume that the initial drop in employment from E¤ = 1 to
E0 < 1 was followed by a continuous drop in the stock of government jobs. Breaking







will be useful to introduce government employment rates ei = Ei=E¤
i , e0 = E0. Let
s > 0 be rate of closing government jobs. Then
_ eH = ¡s; e0
H = e0 given (1 ¡ H)
5and
_ eL = ¡s; e0
L = e0: (1 ¡ L)
Obviously, eH = eL = e = e0¡st. The elimination of the government sector is completed
at date T = E0=s.
Creation of new jobs
We turn now to the description of the creation of private jobs. Let Ni be the number
of i-type workers employed in the private sector. Denote ni = Ni=E¤
i the private
employment rate of i-type workers. We assume that the employment rate increases in
proportion to the ¯rm's pro¯t per worker:










: (2 ¡ L)
Unemployment rate
It is easy to see that the creation of private jobs cannot keep up with the building
down of the government jobs, therefore unemployment emerges. The two types of the
unemployment rates are respectively
uH = 1 ¡ e ¡ nH = ¢e ¡ nH; UH = uHE¤
H (3 ¡ H)
and
uL = 1 ¡ e ¡ nL = ¢e ¡ nL; UL = uLE¤
L; (3 ¡ L)
where ¢e is the absolute value of the change in the government employment rate (both
H- and L-types). We also need the total unemployment U = UH + UL and the total
change in the government jobs ¢E = ¢EH+¢EL. It is assumed that every unemployed
receives a bene¯t b > 0.
Wage equations
We retain the wage equation of A{B, but we break it down for the skilled and the
unskilled labor, respectively. Let r be the rate of interest and c the surplus value of
working over being unemployed. Then














: (4 ¡ L)
6Taxes and transfers
We have a macro budget equation for the taxes, the bene¯ts and the transfers: Ub +




LnLk = (1 ¡ E¤
HuH ¡ E¤
LuL)z: (5)
System of di®erential equations
Note the we have a simultaneous system of equations: the wage depends on the employ-
ment, the employment in turn (via the pro¯ts) depends on the wage. As we will show
in the Appendix, substituting (4) into (2) and using (5) yields












H = 0 (6 ¡ H)
and




yL ¡ cr ¡







L = 0: (6 ¡ L)
Although we have six equations, two of them [(1)] can be solved directly, another
two [(3)] can be eliminated. In fact, we have only two independent equations: nonlinear
di®erential equations. Introducing the notation ¹ yi = yi ¡cr for the reduced productivity
of type i, we have
_ nH = a
¢e ¡ nH










H = 0 (7 ¡ H)
and
_ nL = a
¢e ¡ nL
¢e ¡ nL + ca
µ
¹ yL ¡







L = 0: (7 ¡ L)
We shall call a system viable if all its variables are nonnegative: 0 · nH · ¢e and
0 · nL · ¢e.
3. Analysis
In the section we shall analyze and simulate the simple model with special regard on the
impact of subsidies on the employment of the unskilled workers. Following the order of
logic, we analyze the post-transition and the full periods intermittently.
Preparations
We shall start the analysis with preparations. We shall make three natural assumptions.
A1. The product of the reduced unskilled productivity and the initial employment
rate is greater than the unemployment bene¯t: ¹ yL(1 ¡ u0) > b.
A2. The di®erence between the two productivities is larger than the transfer: 0 ·
k < yH ¡ yL.




Due to its utmost simplicity, it is worth starting the preparations with the beginning
of the transition process. Let us recall that before the private sector takes o®, full em-
ployment in government sector ceases to exist: E0 < E¤, and unemployment suddenly
arises: u0 = 1 ¡ e0 > 0.



















b) The initial earnings are as follows:













Remarks. 1. Due to A2{A1, _ nH(0) > _ nL(0) > 0, i.e. with common u0, wH(0) >
wL(0).
2. While the initial change in H-employment is independent of the value of the





(6) implies _ ni(0) and (4) implies _ wi(0).
We have seen in Theorem 1 that at the start the employment as well as the wage is
respectively greater in the H-sector than in the L-sector. We shall show now that this
is true for the entire period. Because of simultaneity, the direct comparisons of (2{H)
and (2{L) or (4{H) and (4{L) is not enough. Furthermore, it would be economically
unacceptable if an L-worker earned more than an H-worker.
Theorem 2. Under A2, (and apart from the start) the employment as well as
the wage is respectively greater in the H-sector than in the L-sector: nH > nL and
wH > wL.
Remark. The essence of the proof of nH > nL is as follows: it is the last factor
what is decisive in (7), and by ¹ yH > ¹ yL + k, it is larger for H than for L (see the proof
of Theorem 3 below). In turn, wH > wL is a relatively easy consequence of the wage
equations and nH > nL.
Proof. Appendix.
Theorem 1 states that the increase in the subsidies increases the unskilled employ-
ment without (much) changing the skilled employment. Because of continuity, this
favorable result holds for a while. This results is extended for the whole period by
Conjecture 1. With a well-chosen subsidy, the unemployment of the unskilled can
signi¯cantly be reduced without much a®ecting that of the skilled.
Remark. Without assumption A3, if the stock of unskilled workers were much
higher than that of the skilled workers, the conjecture may not be true.
In the next Example, we shall show that in the excluded limit case ¹ k = yH ¡yL, the
di®erences between the employment rates and the wages of the two types disappear,
respectively.
Example 1. In the limit case ¹ k = yH ¡ yL, the employment rate and the wage of
the skilled are identical with those of the unskilled: nH ´ nL and wH ´ wL. In fact, in
that case both factors of the RHS of (7{H) are equal to those of the RHS of (7{L). By
(4), the earning paths are also identical.
8Post-transition period
The post-transition period is characterized by the lack of government sector: [T;1).
Here (1) drops out, thus (7) simpli¯es to a time-invariant system:
_ nH = a
1 ¡ nH









; nH(T) = nT
H (8 ¡ H)
and
_ nL = a
1 ¡ nL









; nL(T) = nT
L · nH(T): (8 ¡ L)
Full employment is a steady state: no
H = 1 and no
L = 1, because the ¯rst factors
of (8) are zero. It is of certain interest that in addition to full employment, there may
exist other viable steady states if the expressions below are positive:
nH = 1 and nL =






nL = 1 and nH =





In fact, if the unemployment bene¯t b is su±ciently high, then both additional steady
states can be positive.
We turn to the next question: is full employment a locally asymptotical stable steady
state of the post-transition system?
Theorem 3. a) Under A1{A2, full employment is the only locally asymptotical
stable steady state.
b) The employment of one type goes monotonically to zero if the pair of end-of-
transition employment rates (nH(T);nL(T)) satisfy the condition
(¹ yL + k)E¤
HnH(T) + ¹ yLE¤
LnL(T) < b: (9 ¡ 1)
c) Both types' employment rates rise monotonically to 1 if the pair of end-of-
transition employment rates (nH(T);nL(T)) satisfy condition
¹ yHE¤
HnH(T) + (¹ yH ¡ k)E¤
LnL(T) > b: (9 ¡ 2)
Remark. 1. Our assumptions are only su±cient but not necessary, nevertheless,
they are not very restrictive. The transfer is reasonably assumed to be much less than
the di®erence between the two productivities, and the unemployment bene¯t in terms
of productivity is also quite small. We shall distinguish two cases: high(er) and low(er)
unemployment bene¯t.
2. The condition (9{2) is not empty, since full employment satis¯es it: (¹ yL+k)E¤
H +
¹ yLE¤
L ¸ ¹ yLE¤
H + ¹ yLE¤
L = ¹ yL > b.
3. According to A2, there exists such a zone between the domains of stability and of
instability, the points of which generate nonmonotonic paths. We should apply sophisti-
cated tools to decide whether any of these points generates a stable or an unstable path.
According to the folklore, two saddle-point unstable steady states are connected by a
separatrix path; points above the separatrix generate stable paths, while points below
the separatrix generate unstable and unviable ones. In the limit case ¹ k = yH ¡yL, this
zone reduces to a single straight line ¹ yHE¤
HnH(T) + ¹ yLE¤
LnL(T) = b.
9Proof. Using the traditional method, ¯rst we shall examine in which states the
one or the other variable of the system remains constant: By (8{H), nH = const. if
nH = 1 or ¹ yHE¤
HnH + (¹ yH ¡ k)E¤
LnL = b;
By (8{L), nL = const. if
nL = 1 or (¹ yL + k)E¤
HnH + ¹ yLE¤
LnL = b:
Four possible pairs would give the steady states: (i) full employment; (ii){(iii) the
additional pairs mentioned before presenting Theorem 3; and (iv) the intersection of
the two straight lines. A simple computation, however, reveals that in state (iv), (8) is
not de¯ned.
Next we turn to the issue, in which states the one or the other variable of the system
increase: By (8{H), _ nH > 0 if and only if
¹ yHE¤
HnH + (¹ yH ¡ k)E¤
LnL > b; (10 ¡ H)
By (8{L), _ nL > 0 if and only if
(¹ yL + k)E¤
HnH + ¹ yLE¤
LnL > b: (10 ¡ L)
By A2|in view of ¹ yH ¡ ¹ yL = yH ¡ yL|(10{L) implies (10{H). (In the opposite case,
it would be also reversed.) Because the variables are strictly increasing, (10{H) always
holds. Since in this region, only full employment is a steady state, the paths starting
from this region converge to full employment. The instability can similarly be proved.
Theorem 4. Full-employment tax and wages are respectively simple functions of
the model's parameters:
z(1) = E¤
Lk; wH(1) = yH ¡ E¤
Hk; wL(1) = yL + E¤
Lk:
Remark. Under A2, wH(1) > wL(1) holds: a completion of Theorem 2. It is
remarkable that in the long run the skilled workers bear the burden of subsidies, because
their net wages diminish by E¤
Lk, while the net wages of the unskilled increase by E¤
Hk,
both from their subsidy-free values.
Proof. Asymptotically, _ ni(1) = 0, (5) implies z(1) = E¤
Lk, i.e. (2) implies
¼i(1) = 0, etc..
In the following part we shall analyze the di®erence between the two types' employ-
ment rates. To do this, we need the following notations. Let °(x) = x¡caln(1¡x) be
a function, mapping [0; 1] ! [0;1]. By simple derivation, it can be shown that




therefore ° has an inverse, which is strictly increasing. Let ¡i(t) = °(ni(t)), i = H;L.
Then we have
10Theorem 5. In the post-transition period, the two employment rates satisfy the
equation
¡H(t) ¡ ¡L(t) = a(yH ¡ yL ¡ k)t + ¡H(T) ¡ ¡L(T); t ¸ T: (11)
Proof. Appendix.
We shall see from the simulations to be presented below that nH(t;k) hardly depends
on k. Then (11) \implies" that nL(t;k) is a strictly increasing function of k (to be also
seen in the simulation).
What is the impact of the transfer on the employment rates? To answer this question,








These indices approximately show the ratios of the change in the employment rates to
a small change in the transfer. With their help, one can formulate
Theorem 6. In the post-transition period, the two employment rates and sensitiv-
ity rates satisfy
mL =
°0(nH)mH + at ¡ ck
°0(nL)
(12)
where ck = °0(nH(T)mH(T) ¡ °0(nL(T)mL(T) is a constant.
Remark. Similarly to Theorem 5, (12) only provides a relative information: if
mH ¸ 0 is known, then nH > nL (Theorem 2) and (12) imply mL > 0, moreover,
mL > mH. However, if mH · 0, then we are lost.
Proof. Appendix
Analysis of transition
To guarantee a successful transition, we need even stricter conditions; but they are
di±cult to obtain analytically. In our 2-sector model, we can only conjecture and
simulate the analytical observation of the 1-sector model of A{B.
Conjecture 2. To any closing rate s > 0 there belongs a maximal unemployment
rate u0(s), for which the system is still viable. Higher closing rate determines a lower
maximal unemployment rate.
114. Simulation
Having reached the limits of our analytical power, we turn now to simulation.
Simulating the post-transition period
Since in our model full employment is only reached in the long run (at the end of
the post-transition period) and only for su±ciently high end-of-transition employment,
we must discuss the transient paths of the post-transition period. Because of their
complexity, we must use simulation.
Since we only touch the government sector's closing, we deviate from A{B at several
points. We shall work with the following parameter set: E¤
H = 0:5; E¤
L = 0:5; u0 = 0:04.
yH = 1. yL = 0:7; b = 0:3; a = 0:24, c = 1:5; r = 0:1. Then T = 24 years. For the time
being, we exclude subsidies, i.e. k2 = 0 and k1 = 0:03.
First we shall display the stability and instability domains of Theorem 3.
Figure 1
It can be seen in the ¯gure that for \initial" states NH(T) = 0:26 and NL(T) = 0:26
(where the unemployment rate is 48 per cent), the system still converges. Diminishing
the end-of-transition employment rates and stepping over the instability line (9{1), the
path starting from NH(T) = 0:2 and NL(T) = 0:16 is unstable.
Simulating the full period
Turning to the simulation of the full period, we retain the zero subsidy assumption:
k2 = 0. Using the same data as in Figure 1, the system converges to full employment,
although the employment rate is very low at the closure of the government sector:
NH(T) = 0:38 and NL(T) = 0:2; the unemployment is tragically high and extremely
disproportionate: UH(T) = 0:12 and UL(T) = 0:3 (Figure 2a). The wages ¯rst decrease,
then increase (Figure 2b). The tax rate ¯rst increases, then decreases. The two types'
tax rates do not diverge too much (Figure 2c) and they are equal in average.
Figure 2
On the basis of Figure 1, one might suppose that for parameters not so well-chosen
the transition path ends out of the stability domain, therefore the post-transition system
explodes.
As was already mentioned, we are working with time-invariant transfers, namely
k1 = 0:03. Our calculation would be more precise if the transfers were at least cleared
ex-post. Let us denote the length of an elementary interval by h, then k(t + h) be




z(t) ¡ k(t + h)
wL(t)
:
Numerical simulations attest that using an averaging constant transfer is conducive to
almost the same.
In Figure 3, we discuss the path with transfer k = 0:1 of which k2 = 0:07 can be
considered as subsidies. As we hoped for, the introduction of subsidies pushed up the
employment of the unskilled, while hardly a®ecting that of the skilled. Again, we cite
12the end-of-transition data: NH(T) = 0:384; NL(T) = 0:271. The employment of the
unskilled jumped by 7 per cent points, and even the employment of the skilled rose by
0,4 per cent points.
Figure 3
We arrived now to the centerpiece of our analysis: the role of unemployment bene¯t.
Until now the unemployment bene¯t was quite high: 0.3. Now we investigate what
happens if the bene¯t is reduced to 0.2 (cf. rows 3-4 of Table 3 above). We shall discuss
both cases of no subsidies and subsidies, but now the compensation k1 drops from 0.03
to 0.015. With no subsidies: NH(T) = 0:431; NL(T) = 0:338 (Figure 4); with subsidies:
NH(T) = 0:428; NL(T) = 0:366 (Figure 5). The creation of new jobs becomes quicker
and full employment is reached earlier. At the same time, for a lower unemployment
bene¯t, the introduction of subsidies diminishes the skilled employment by 0.3 per cent
and raises that of the unskilled by only 2.8 per cent.
Figure 4
Figure 5
Until now we have displayed various scenarios (high bene¯t{no subsidy, high bene¯t{
subsidy, low bene¯t{no subsidy, etc.) separately. It is worthwhile to compare them,
too. Let us start the comparison with the key variable, namely the employment of low-
skilled (Figure 6a). The introduction of subsidy improves the situation, but lowering the
unemployment bene¯t (without the help of subsidy) is even more e®ective. This ordering
is even more visible with the employment dynamics of high-skilled (Figure 6b), where
only the lowering of the unemployment bene¯t has a favorable impact. Concerning the
total employment, the impact of the subsidy is also important (Figure 6c).
Turning to the wages, the emerging picture is similar to the previous one. The in-
troduction of subsidy with high unemployment bene¯t raises the wage of the low-skilled
workers, but much less than its replacement with a lower unemployment bene¯t (Figure
7a.) Concerning the wage of high-skilled workers, the favorable impact of subsidy is
negligible in comparison with that of the lowering of the bene¯t (Figure 7b). Finally,
turning to the wage inequalities, represented by ln(wH=wL) is more complex (Figure
7c): The introduction of a subsidy obviously diminishes the inequality, but the lowering
of the bene¯t also reduces it. In the ¯rst 30 years, the reduction is stronger with the
subsidy scenario, but after that subsidy proves stronger.
Before ¯nishing the simulation of the simple model, we must simulate Conjecture 2
concerning the connection between the closing rate of government sector (Column 1) and
the maximal unemployment rate (Column 2), yielding a viable path. The compensation
rate is uniformly 0.035.
Table 4. Minimal viable initial employment as a function the rate of building-down






It is visible that the faster the closing, the lower initial unemployment rate is feasible.
Indeed, for s = 0:01, u0 = 0:47; while for s = 0:04, \only" u0 = 0:2.
135. The complex model
For the sake of simplicity, up to now we have pretended that every skilled worker is
employed in the M-sector and every unskilled worked is employed in the S-sector. It is
high time to give up this simpli¯cation. We shall only assume that the M-sector em-
ploys skilled workers in high proportions and the S-sector does the same with unskilled
workers. This makes our model more realistic, and justi¯es the persistent relation: the
pro¯t rate is higher in the M-sector than in the S-sector. Here we return from the
employment rates to the original variables.
For simplicity, we assume that due to complementarities, both types of sectors em-
ploy workers in ¯xed proportions: let ¯fi be the proportion of i-type workers employed
by f-type sector: ¯fH + ¯fL = 1, f = M;S. By assumptions, 0 · ¯SH < ¯MH · 1. In
the simple model, ¯SH = 0 and ¯MH = 1.
New equations
We present the new, further desaggregated equations.
Closing of government sector
_ ei = ¡s; e0
i given: (1)
Jobs in the private sector
nfi = ¯fiNf; Nf = NfH + NfU; Ni = NMi + NSi:




¯fi(yi ¡ wi ¡ z + ki): (13)
New jobs




i ¡ Ei ¡ Ni = ¢Ei ¡ Ni; U = UH + UL: (3)
Wages








Ub + NLk = (1 ¡ U)z: (5)
After substitutions, as described in the Appendix, one obtains the explicit basic
di®erential equation system:
_ NH =
(1 + ®LL)CH ¡ ®HLCL
±
and _ NL =






















The following question arises: will the earlier result survive in the new model? It seems
to be obvious that the su±cient condition for stability remains valid if the two sectors are
di®erent enough in terms of skill composition. To obtain a precise stability condition,
one must analyze the 2 £ 2 derivative matrix f0
N(N) taken at N = (E¤
H;E¤
L): if both
characteristic roots are less than 1 in absolute value, then the system is asymptotically
locally stable.
The statements on the initial and the end values remain valid.
New simulations
Let us suppose that the M-sector employs skilled workers in 80 per cent, while the
S-sector employs unskilled workers on the same scale: ¯MH = 0:8 and ¯SL = 0:8. In
case of no subsidies (k2 = 0), the employment of the skilled workers grows slower than
in the simple model, but the employment of the unskilled workers signi¯cantly rises:
NH(T) = 0:369 and NL(T) = 0:245 { there is an intra-¯rm subsidy (Figure 8a). At the
same time, the wage of skilled workers may temporarily surpass even their productivity
(Figure 8b). Full employment is a stable steady state, it is reached within 80 years.
Figure 8
We could display the impacts of introducing subsidies or of diminishing the unem-
ployment bene¯t on employment rates. Here we only refer to Table 3 given at the
end of the Introduction. The change with respect to the simple model is favorable but
moderate: NH(T) = 0:375 and NL(T) = 0:291.
6. Conclusions
The A{B-paper has clearly modeled the dynamic interaction between privatization and
creation of new jobs, but by necessity, neglected the heterogeneity of the workers and
the sector. In the present paper, we only modi¯ed the A{B-model by distinguishing
skilled and unskilled workers, employed by the M- and S-sectors with di®erent propor-
tions, respectively. The employment of the unskilled is subsidized. First we examined
the simple model, where M-sector employs only skilled workers and S-sector employs
only unskilled workers. Here a suitable choice of subsidies raises the employment of
15the unskilled labor without a®ecting that of the skilled labor. In the complex model,
the impact of subsidization is more limited because through the ¯xed employment pro-
portions, the employment of the skilled labor necessitates that of the unskilled labor.
Further analysis is needed for a better understanding of the two models.
Appendix
Derivation of (6)
Let us introduce kH = 0 and kL = k. Substituting (4) into (2), yields for i = H;L
_ ni = a
µ


















and rearranging, yields (6{H) and (6{L).
Proof of Theorem 2
a) First we prove the employment inequality. We shall formulate system (7) in a more
general form:
_ nH = g(t;nH)hH(t;nH;nL); n0
H = 0 (A1 ¡ H)
and
_ nL = g(t;nL)hL(t;nH;nL); n0
L = 0: (A1 ¡ L)
According to Theorem 1, H-employment increases faster than L-employment, both
starting from 0. We shall prove the inequality for an arbitrary t > 0, assuming the
contrary. Let us assume that it is at date to > 0, where the inequality is ¯rst upset:
nH(t) intersects nL(t) from above. Substituting nH(to) = nL(to) = no into (A1), the
¯rst factors ate again equal, and for the second factors, hH(to;no;no) ¸ hL(to;no;no)
holds, i.e. by (A1), _ nH(to) ¸ _ nL(to), contradicting the intersection condition.
b) Assume the contrary: there exists an instant to such at which wH(to) · wL(to).
Since wH(0) > wL(0), and the wage{time functions are continuous, there exists a date
¹ t · to at which wH(¹ t) = wL(¹ t). Consider the di®erence between (2{H) and (2{L) at
this instant:
_ nH(¹ t) ¡ _ nL(¹ t) = a(yH ¡ yL ¡ k):
By A2, _ nH(¹ t) > _ nL(¹ t). Due to the employment inequality, uH(¹ t) < uL(¹ t). Comparing
(4{H) and (4{L): wH(¹ t) > wL(¹ t), a contradiction.
16Proof of Theorem 5
Rearrange (8) so that only the expression in () remain at the RHS:
1 ¡ nH + ca
a(1 ¡ nH)







H = nH(T) (80 ¡ H)
and
1 ¡ nL + ca
a(1 ¡ nL)







L = nL(T) · nH(T): (80 ¡ L)
Taking into account




and deducing (8'{L) from (8'{L), yields
_ ¡H ¡ _ ¡L = a(yH ¡ yL ¡ k): (A:2)
Integration yields (11).
Proof of Theorem 6
Take the derivative of both sides of (11) with respect to k:
°0(nH)mH ¡ °0(nL)mL = ¡at + ck: (A:3)
This already implies (12).
Derivation of (6*)
Inserting (4) into (13), and then the newly obtained equation into (2*):











¡ z + ki0
#
:
















Introducing notation (14) for the ¯rst double sum and interchanging the order of sum-
mation in the second, yields












Introducing notation (15), one obtains a two-variable two-dimensional algebraic linear
equation system for _ NH and _ NL. Warning: the coe±cients appearing in (14), (15) and
(5) are not constants!
17References
Aghion, Phillip and Blanchard, Olivier. J. (1993): On the speed of transition in Central
Europe, London, ERBD Working Paper 6.
Brixiova, Zuzana and Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro (1997): Private sector development in tran-
sition economies, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol 46
(June), pp. 241-280.
Boeri, Tito (2001): Transition with labor supply, IZA Discussion Paper No. 257, Feb-
ruary.
Commander, Simon and Tolstopyatenko, Andrei (2001): A model of the informal econ-
omy in the transition setting, EBRD and The World Bank, mimeo.
European Commission (2003): Employment and labour market in Central European
countries.
Halpern, L¶ aszl¶ o; Koren, Mikl¶ os, K} orÄ osi, G¶ abor and Vincze, J¶ anos (2004): The impact
of minimum wages on the budget, KÄ ozgazdas¶ agi Szemle 51, (in Hungarian).
Jurajda, Stepan and Terrell, Katherine (2003): What drives the speed of reallocation in
episodes of massive reallocation?, IZA Discussion Paper No. 601, Bonn, and William
Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 432, Ann Arbor
OECD (2003): Employment Outlook.
OECD (2004): Education at a Glance.
18